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argue that the term 'leopard alarm' is misleading, because it connotes a greater degree of
referential specificity than can be supported by the empirical data. Such criticism would,
however, be unfair, because it is clear that the term 'leopard' was intended as a shorthand
description for a category of eliciting stimuli of which large spotted cats are, if not the
prototypical exemplar, at least the most common (Seyfarth et al., 1980b). Nevertheless, there
is the real danger that the terms selected to describe eliciting conditions may reveal more about
human linguistic conventions and about the categorization behaviour of the investigators than
about the information content of the signals being studied. Such labels, when applied
prematurely, may also affect the choice of future experiments (Snowdon, 1990). If a class of
signals is labelled 'food calls' then we are perhaps less likely to conduct studies involving
qualitatively different stimuli, even though they might reveal behaviour that would
fundamentally alter our interpretation, such as calling during affiliative social interactions in the
absence of food. Labels are rarely neutral; they reflect our intuition about the properties of the
system being studied and they have the potential to constrain the direction of our research.
There are several possible solutions to the labelling problem. The first is suggested by the
study of animal signals that do not have the property of functional reference. There is
consequently no temptation to apply linguistic terms. The songs of birds or the calls of anuran
amphibians are identified with labels that are either completely arbitrary or perhaps reflect some
aspect of acoustic structure. This has, of course, been the traditional practice in studies of
primate vocal behaviour, so that we read of 'rough grunts' in chimpanzees (Marler, 1976),
'threat-alarm-barks' in vervets (Struhsaker, 1967) and 'isolation peeps' in squirrel monkeys
(Snowdon et al., 1985). It is difficult, however, to employ structural terms when faced with a
vocal repertoire containing sounds for which we cannot readily coin onomatopoeic
descriptions. The chicken's vocal repertoire includes a number of pulsatile sounds that do not
lend themselves to economical prose description, although the eliciting conditions (food, social
affiliation, and approach of predators) do. One way to avoid this problem would be to use
completely arbitrary terms that were neutral with regard to issues of call meaning - so that we
might speak of pulsatile call1, pulsatile call2, and pulsatile call3. The obvious cost of such an
approach is that our prose would become opaque and probably quite incomprehensible to the
non-specialist. The demands of terminological precision are thus to some degree incompatible
with those of eloquence.
The most straightforward solution might be to inform the reader at the outset about the way in
which terms are to be used. We will then be able to discriminate between: (i) 'leopard' as a
shorthand description for a category of calls with particular acoustic characteristics, elicited by,
among other things, leopards, and (ii) 'leopard', a signal evoking mental representations of
spotted cats in the minds of receivers, and sharing with some words the property of denoting a
precisely-defined category of external objects. Clearly these two usages make very different
claims about the cognitive underpinnings of the signal being studied, and they will be evaluated
according to correspondingly different logical and empirical criteria.
VII.UNDERSTANDING VARIATION IN SIGNAL STRUCTURE: THE IMPORTANCE
OF LEVELS
I have so far been discussing analyses that are concerned with variation at the level of call type.
These involve identification of the eliciting event and of the factors mediating transitions from
one signal class to another. Much less is known about the factors responsible for variation in
signal structure within call type (Marler et al., 1992), although efforts have been made to
ensure that such variation is represented in the exemplars chosen for use in playback
experiments (e.g., Seyfarth et al., 1980b; Evans et al., 1993a). I suggest that the distinction
between within-type and between-type variation is an important one, because systems may well
prove to be referential at one level but not at the other.
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